I’m at a disadvantage in responding to Gerald Hiestand’s essay on why Christianity is good for women. First, I primarily write about men’s issues, not women’s. Second, Hiestand is writing a sales pitch to women who might have reservations about Christianity. His purposes are rhetorical rather than analytic, hence his essay is not intended to be a complete discussion of the topic.
What he does do in it is utilize patterns of rhetoric that are common in how evangelicals talk about gender. My response will thus focus on these patterns in order to make people more conscious of what they are and how they operate. I will not attempt to provide a case for what the correct answers should be, but only point out these common patterns. And while I agree with him that Christianity is good for women – and men – I will not address that specific point either.
The first pattern is that Hiestand assumes that secular feminist moral sensibilities are the correct moral framework for evaluating Christianity. That is, he takes the moral sensibilities underlying contemporary secular feminism, and uses them as the yardstick for determining whether Christianity measures up (rather than vice versa).
He writes, “Women have made significant progress in all these areas over the past hundred years, and I take it as axiomatic that these gains have been consistent with Christian ideals.” He treats male misbehavior as the fundamental problem affecting women. He says that, rightly understood, Christianity exalts women.
We see the pattern most explicitly when he invokes it in his thesis statement: “To state my central claim a bit more provocatively, my argument is that Christianity has been more ‘feminist’ than feminism.” He presupposes that the aims of feminism – its contemporary moral sensibilities – are the correct ones, but that the feminist program is inferior to Christianity in delivering the goods. In essence, he affirms that the secular moral framework is correct.
This is a common pattern both within evangelicalism and in conservative political culture. For example, in response to the Black Lives Matter movement, some conservatives will make arguments such as, “If you really care about black lives, you should support strong policing because blacks are the biggest victims of crime.” It assumes the moral framework of BLM, and argues within that. Much of the apologetic and evangelic approach of cultural engagement evangelicalism operates this way. It argues that Christianity is the right answer for their pre-existing secular moral goals and intuitions.
In a Secular Age and a Negative World, I am deeply skeptical of the idea that the moral sensibilities of the culture are actually Christianity’s, even if they overlap in part with and evolved in part from Christianity.
Secondly, Hiestand uses feminism as a hermeneutic for interpreting scripture and Christian history. Having affirmed that secular feminist moral sensibilities are the correct ones, he then interprets Christianity’s teachings on gender in light of that.
In this approach, elements of Christianity that align with feminist sensibilities are emphasized, even exaggerated, while those which conflict with it are minimized. So, the obligation of husbands to love their wife and give themselves up for her is magnified. Hiestand goes so far as to make the dubious argument that, “The wife’s good, even above the husband’s good, is the chief end—the Aristotelian telos—of the marriage.” Men’s characteristic sins are numerous, and he sees Christianity as a restraining force on them, though thinks in practice it hasn’t gone far enough. “No one (certainly not I) would claim that Christianity has adequately constrained all male sexual power.”
By contrast, Hiestand gives only the barest mention to the Biblical instructions around submission in marriage. He doesn’t list any characteristically female sins, not even those from, for example, 1 Timothy 5:13. Christianity does not seem to put any non-therapeutic constraints (see below) on women. In fact, Hiestand says, “Christianity actually loosened the Greco-Roman constraints on female marital sexual activity.”
Again, this is the most common way evangelicals talk about gender, as I have previously documented in my analysis of the evangelical servant leader concept and the teachings of Mark Driscoll.
Thirdy, for Hiestand, male sins are sinful absolutely while female sins are only sinful therapeutically. By sinful therapeutically, I mean that they are merely seen as being an incorrect or suboptimal path to human flourishing. The main issue with them is that they are bad for the sinner, not that they are a moral transgression or offend God.
Male sins such as promiscuity, abuse, etc. are unequivocally denounced as wrong, as well they should be. But when discussing female sins, to the extent that he discusses them at all, Hiestand mostly says that they are bad for the women themselves rather than being morally wrong. He cites the atheist feminist Louise Perry, not the Bible or any Christian source, in support of this view. Perry argues that the problem with the Sexual Revolution is not that it goes against God’s law, but that it produces bad results for women. She wants to retain what works for women while modifying what doesn’t work for women (in her opinion at least). Hiestand says, “Perry contends, despite the widespread availability of contraception, and the legalization of abortion, the sexual revolution has been—on the whole—a disaster for women.”
By invoking this argument, Hiestand in effect argues that women who, for example, sleep around just like the guys do are suffering from a sort of false consciousness. They were deceived by secular ideologies that misled them into thinking this was the path to flourishing. This is similar to how most anti-abortion groups talk about that issue. The National Right to Life’s official position is that women as well as babies are victims of abortion, for example.
This pattern is again common in evangelicalism on a broad scale. Sins which the world condemns, such as racism or abuse, are treated extremely harshly, and are seen as justifying extraordinary efforts and procedures to root out of the church. Sins which the world affirms, by contrast, are treated as mere therapeutic issues. In fact, you’ll sometimes hear “laments” about how the church has been an unwelcoming place for those who’ve committed those particular sins.
I am not the first person to note some of these patterns. In his book The Death of Christian Britain, British academic Callum Brown noted that around the turn of the 19th century there was a shift in which piety began to be viewed as a female rather than male characteristic. He surveyed the evangelical literature of the 19th century, finding that it tended to portray women as naturally virtuous, even not really fallen, whereas men are the source of evil and the leading threat to women. He writes:
In evangelical stories about piety, women appeared throughout as good but not always converted; men, by contrast, almost always appeared as in a perilous sinful state until near the end. Men were the problem, given manifold temptations: drink (nearly always), gambling (increasingly after 1890), and ‘rough’ in overall cultural terms. They lived dissipated lives which caused suffering and ruination to mothers, wives, and children. Nowhere did evangelical literature have such a powerful influence in the public domain, including in ‘secular’ fiction, as in its demonization of men.
Callum also writes, “A large proportion of evangelical stories of men centered on the destruction of families by male evils.” This is similar to Hiestand’s view in which male vice is the fundamental problem, which Christianity restrains. Women are not materially sinners, only victims. Women are to be elevated to a paramount position within the family.
Hiestand’s rhetoric is thus not new or unique to him. It’s a contemporary version of a longstanding approach, and reflective of how other evangelicals talk on gender and other subjects in the world today.
I’m at a disadvantage in responding to Gerald Hiestand’s essay on why Christianity is good for women. First, I primarily write about men’s issues, not women’s. Second, Hiestand is writing a sales pitch to women who might have reservations about Christianity. His purposes are rhetorical rather than analytic, hence his essay is not intended to be a complete discussion of the topic.
What he does do in it is utilize patterns of rhetoric that are common in how evangelicals talk about gender. My response will thus focus on these patterns in order to make people more conscious of what they are and how they operate. I will not attempt to provide a case for what the correct answers should be, but only point out these common patterns. And while I agree with him that Christianity is good for women – and men – I will not address that specific point either.
The first pattern is that Hiestand assumes that secular feminist moral sensibilities are the correct moral framework for evaluating Christianity. That is, he takes the moral sensibilities underlying contemporary secular feminism, and uses them as the yardstick for determining whether Christianity measures up (rather than vice versa).
He writes, “Women have made significant progress in all these areas over the past hundred years, and I take it as axiomatic that these gains have been consistent with Christian ideals.” He treats male misbehavior as the fundamental problem affecting women. He says that, rightly understood, Christianity exalts women.
We see the pattern most explicitly when he invokes it in his thesis statement: “To state my central claim a bit more provocatively, my argument is that Christianity has been more ‘feminist’ than feminism.” He presupposes that the aims of feminism – its contemporary moral sensibilities – are the correct ones, but that the feminist program is inferior to Christianity in delivering the goods. In essence, he affirms that the secular moral framework is correct.
This is a common pattern both within evangelicalism and in conservative political culture. For example, in response to the Black Lives Matter movement, some conservatives will make arguments such as, “If you really care about black lives, you should support strong policing because blacks are the biggest victims of crime.” It assumes the moral framework of BLM, and argues within that. Much of the apologetic and evangelic approach of cultural engagement evangelicalism operates this way. It argues that Christianity is the right answer for their pre-existing secular moral goals and intuitions.
In a Secular Age and a Negative World, I am deeply skeptical of the idea that the moral sensibilities of the culture are actually Christianity’s, even if they overlap in part with and evolved in part from Christianity.
Secondly, Hiestand uses feminism as a hermeneutic for interpreting scripture and Christian history. Having affirmed that secular feminist moral sensibilities are the correct ones, he then interprets Christianity’s teachings on gender in light of that.
In this approach, elements of Christianity that align with feminist sensibilities are emphasized, even exaggerated, while those which conflict with it are minimized. So, the obligation of husbands to love their wife and give themselves up for her is magnified. Hiestand goes so far as to make the dubious argument that, “The wife’s good, even above the husband’s good, is the chief end—the Aristotelian telos—of the marriage.” Men’s characteristic sins are numerous, and he sees Christianity as a restraining force on them, though thinks in practice it hasn’t gone far enough. “No one (certainly not I) would claim that Christianity has adequately constrained all male sexual power.”
By contrast, Hiestand gives only the barest mention to the Biblical instructions around submission in marriage. He doesn’t list any characteristically female sins, not even those from, for example, 1 Timothy 5:13. Christianity does not seem to put any non-therapeutic constraints (see below) on women. In fact, Hiestand says, “Christianity actually loosened the Greco-Roman constraints on female marital sexual activity.”
Again, this is the most common way evangelicals talk about gender, as I have previously documented in my analysis of the evangelical servant leader concept and the teachings of Mark Driscoll.
Thirdy, for Hiestand, male sins are sinful absolutely while female sins are only sinful therapeutically. By sinful therapeutically, I mean that they are merely seen as being an incorrect or suboptimal path to human flourishing. The main issue with them is that they are bad for the sinner, not that they are a moral transgression or offend God.
Male sins such as promiscuity, abuse, etc. are unequivocally denounced as wrong, as well they should be. But when discussing female sins, to the extent that he discusses them at all, Hiestand mostly says that they are bad for the women themselves rather than being morally wrong. He cites the atheist feminist Louise Perry, not the Bible or any Christian source, in support of this view. Perry argues that the problem with the Sexual Revolution is not that it goes against God’s law, but that it produces bad results for women. She wants to retain what works for women while modifying what doesn’t work for women (in her opinion at least). Hiestand says, “Perry contends, despite the widespread availability of contraception, and the legalization of abortion, the sexual revolution has been—on the whole—a disaster for women.”
By invoking this argument, Hiestand in effect argues that women who, for example, sleep around just like the guys do are suffering from a sort of false consciousness. They were deceived by secular ideologies that misled them into thinking this was the path to flourishing. This is similar to how most anti-abortion groups talk about that issue. The National Right to Life’s official position is that women as well as babies are victims of abortion, for example.
This pattern is again common in evangelicalism on a broad scale. Sins which the world condemns, such as racism or abuse, are treated extremely harshly, and are seen as justifying extraordinary efforts and procedures to root out of the church. Sins which the world affirms, by contrast, are treated as mere therapeutic issues. In fact, you’ll sometimes hear “laments” about how the church has been an unwelcoming place for those who’ve committed those particular sins.
I am not the first person to note some of these patterns. In his book The Death of Christian Britain, British academic Callum Brown noted that around the turn of the 19th century there was a shift in which piety began to be viewed as a female rather than male characteristic. He surveyed the evangelical literature of the 19th century, finding that it tended to portray women as naturally virtuous, even not really fallen, whereas men are the source of evil and the leading threat to women. He writes:
In evangelical stories about piety, women appeared throughout as good but not always converted; men, by contrast, almost always appeared as in a perilous sinful state until near the end. Men were the problem, given manifold temptations: drink (nearly always), gambling (increasingly after 1890), and ‘rough’ in overall cultural terms. They lived dissipated lives which caused suffering and ruination to mothers, wives, and children. Nowhere did evangelical literature have such a powerful influence in the public domain, including in ‘secular’ fiction, as in its demonization of men.
Callum also writes, “A large proportion of evangelical stories of men centered on the destruction of families by male evils.” This is similar to Hiestand’s view in which male vice is the fundamental problem, which Christianity restrains. Women are not materially sinners, only victims. Women are to be elevated to a paramount position within the family.
Hiestand’s rhetoric is thus not new or unique to him. It’s a contemporary version of a longstanding approach, and reflective of how other evangelicals talk on gender and other subjects in the world today.
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