Trinity in Creation

I am grateful for the privilege to participate in this dialogue and offer some thoughts. There are many lines Dr. Leithart’s essay raises. However, I will focus on the question of whether the Trinity is knowable from the Old Testament, a key element to his essay (and others following).

The question can be distinguished in many ways, and in each the response will be distinct. For example, one can distinguish what is meant by “knowable.” For one can know either in judgment, saying “it is” in an affirmation or “it is not” in a negation (an sit); or in understanding, saying “what it is” (quid sit) either wholly or partly. In the theological science, the fruit of all judgments and understanding we can muster is entrusted to treatises on dogmatics and systematics, respectively. Frequently, dogmatics and systematics interleave in one volume and are not clearly signaled as distinct. Still, they are distinct and this distinction endures, because with us and among creatures existence and essence are really distinct and our intellect has order to creatures. We can and do adjust for this when we consider He Who Is, but it remains residual even after its negation. It hangs about us as creatures in the dust and on our way or great return to God; it hangs about us when and after God takes on our dust and pitches his tent among us; it hangs about us until the veil is thrown off and we behold He Who Is Unknown. Hence, whenever we consider the holy Trinity (de deo trino), there is a twofold mode of treatment:^[1] we demonstrate in dogmatics that it is, proceeding in no way except from holy Scripture ultimately and in faith; we then explain in systematics what it is (or, who each person is) and achieve some understanding of this Mystery of the catholic faith.^[2] Nonetheless, in systematics, never can we neglect the cardinal principle for all understanding of the Trinity: in any similitude, let there be found the ever-greater dissimilitude (Lateran IV).^[3] For indeed the object we consider is Mystery.^[4] Yet we have reason for praise, for “Christ has filled out Mystery”^[5]--praise indeed, “for the knowledge of the Trinity in Unity is the joy and end of our whole life.”^[6] Yet this still is Mystery. Si comprehendis, non est Deus!, Augustine reminds. The implication, in other terms: whilst we can with God’s help achieve some understanding, this is from the beginning, to the end, and through and through analogicalunderstanding and not otherwise, in this life. Regardless, because with us and among creatures always the question “is it” is prior to the question “what is it,” I will consider our question firstly (and, due to space, only) with respect to whether one can know from the Old Testament that the Trinity is (an sit).

To rephrase, our question is: Is “that the Trinity is” demonstrable from the Old Testament? Regularly, we field this question in ecumencial discussion, because there is no need to consider it otherwise. With those who accept the supernatural authority of the New Testament, we do not need to contort ourselves into a hypothetical where the New Testament is excluded and a demonstration is sought from the Old only. Indeed, when asking the question, we still proceed from the affirmative judgment of faith that the Trinity is, a judgment principled by the testimony of God speaking in Christ.

Our question then is motivated in relation to those who (1) do accept in some way the supernatural authority of the Old Testament but (2) do not accept in any way the supernatural authority of the New Testament--for example, Jews and Muslims. Can we expect their assent to the Trinity from the Old Testament only? Can we seek it, by presenting the supernatural authority they accept as, indeed, supernatural: God himself speaking, not another? Has God, in what is written in the Old Testament, given testimony in some way to move all who accept it to confess that the Father is, that the Son is, that the Holy Spirit is?

As I am aware, in the history of the catholic church, there are two opinions on our question: the Trinity is not demonstrable from the Old Testament, and the Trinity is demonstrable from the Old Testament. First, I review the genesis of these opinions; then, explain how to answer the question; and lastly return to some lines my colleagues have raised in this contemporary discussion.

Reminder from History: Development of Two Opinions

Once there was a man named Alonso Fernandez de Madrigal, or Abulensis Tostado, his Latin name. Born in Spain around 1400, Tostado was among the real princes of Salamanca and the most significant exegetes in Spain in his century and several subsequent. As I am aware, it appears that Tostado prompted the first significant, protracted debate on our question, when he said the Trinity is not demonstrable from the Old Testament.

Tostado was truly an extraordinary exegete, especially of the Old Testament.^[7] Unsurprisingly, he weighed in on this question in his commentaries; but it was in a shorter work on the holy Trinity where he considered the question directly: in his Opuscula eruditissima…, the first of whose books is De sanctissima trinitate, the first of whose chapters is, Whether the authority of the Old Testament can persuade for assent to the Trinity of persons?^[8] Originally, the piece was a neoscholastic repetitio. Upon lectio, reading, came quaestio, inquiry, where a disputed question was engaged--often by a magister and frequently in light of seemingly conflicting authorities (sic/non); the Lombard’s Sententiae had made this the task of many centuries. The question’s resolution (reportatio) was the determination or matured opinion (opinio) issued by a magister at the height of his powers; the humbler repetitio was similar to this, but issued by a student as (hopefully) the triumph of his bachelor study.

“From the authorities of the Old Testament,” Tostado says, “the plurality of [divine] persons, even though it is persuasible, nevertheless is not necessarily convincible.”^[9] He goes on: “Although from the writings of the Old Testament, the plurality of divine persons can be proved, nevertheless in no way can the Trinity distinctly be proved.”^[10] “In the New Testament, the Trinity of persons is proved with absolute clarity, such that when the evangelical law has been taken up, it is impossible for any to deny that the Trinity of persons is.”^[11] Tostado invokes New Testament texts or implications, such as “Christ says he is God”--and then: “From these things, a corollary follows: it is dangerous for any believer, wise or unlearned, to argue about the Trinity of persons against the Jews, so long as they remain in their error.”^[12] If not that, then what are they to do?: “Rather, those who want to dispute with the Jews may only try to prove that the Messiah promised in the Law has come; that this one has the right for giving a new law; and that all men are bound to assent to him, and ipso facto a Jew is obligated from the law of the Old to hold the evangelical law. And besides, if he has embraced the evangelical law, then he will assent to all its articles and it will not be necessary for them to be proved or for us to labor in this.”^[13]

The work and its claims caused a stir in the guild of theologians. Whilst Tostado couched it toward Jews, it triangulated the three Abrahamic faiths at a time in Spain where Jews, Muslims, and catholics were close associates, to put it mildly; the 1400s in Spain was the time of la convivencia, the cohabitation of Abraham’s children, more or less harmonious and more or less fragile. Certain theologians, in response, pushed for censure. They debated Tostado rather aggressively, and this response accrues to the second opinion: the Trinity is demonstrable from the Old Testament. Standard New Testament texts were cited, where Christ and his apostles employ the Old Testament when considering the holy Trinity; similarly, the fathers and councils were mustered, given their extensive use of Old Testament texts in trinitarian controversies. (Most theologians were familiar with this not least due to the Sentence commentary tradition, where Lombard assembled authorities on this issue, usually considered at I Sent d 2.) Works had been written that seemed to support this affirmative opinion; perhaps most famously was Nicholas of Lyra’s response to “whether from the writings received from the Jews, that our Savior was God and man can be efficaciously demonstrated.”^[14] The work also dealt with the issue of the Elohim in Genesis.

Thus two opinions came to be, a negative and affirmative: the Trinity is not demonstrable from the Old Testament (e.g., Tostado), and the Trinity is demonstrable from the Old Testament (a number of theologians, e.g., the much later Franciscus Zumel (1540–1607), In ST I q 32 a 1, who judged Tostado’s opinion to be false but was milder than others). The debate and its effects endured well over a century after Tostado. The Dominican Domingo Banez, student of Melchior Cano and Magister de Soto, eternal foe of Molina, confessor of St. Teresa of Avila, praeclarissimum iubar of Spain and of the league of Salamanca, and perhaps the best theologian of the sixteenth century, faces it head-on in the 1580s because, he says, “Abulensis in a certain repetitio which he wrote on the Trinity says something for which he is fiercely rebuked by theologians of our time.”^[15]

The issue was not restricted to Roman Catholics; parallel debates occur among Protestants in the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries. For example, on the narrower issue of the Elohim in Genesis, Calvin famously took the “Judaizing line”: Elohim is not a proper (proprie) plural, but a plural of majesty. This sharply contrasted with Zanchi’s famous De tribus elohim (1572), where Zanchi enthusiastically argued for the “plural proprie,” and finding the Trinity in the Old Testament generally. Face-offs continued: Pareus (for Calvin) and then Hunnius, whom we can likely conclude had some antipathy for Calvin: Calvin the Judaizer: The Jewish Glosses and Corruptions, Whereby John Calvin Was So Brazen as to Disgustingly Pervert the Clearest Passages and Testimonies in Holy Scripture for the Glorious Trinity and Christ’s and the Holy Spirit’s Deity, Especially the Prophets’ Predictions on the Messiah’s Coming, Birth, Passion, Resurrection, Ascension into Heaven, and Session at the Right Hand of God. Also a Refutation of Calvin’s Corruptions.^[16] Franciscus Junius was a quieter soul; a powerful theologian and exegete, also among the Reformed, he would side with Zanchi.

The issue was clouded. Those who took the negative opinion took fire not only from their own ranks (cf Hunnius), but also from outside. Some Roman Catholic theologians pointed out that the Reformed, given their weakness on the Trinity, could be in part to blame for the rise of Antitrinitarians. Still, many Roman Catholics would read Calvin e.g. and bestow great charity given some of his sayings on other issues of Trinity--consider, e.g., the Jesuit Montoya’s massive De trinitate. As an opener, Montoya deals with the Autotheans and kindly separates Servetus and others from Calvin, siding against other Roman Catholics, by quoting Bellarmine himself, who “tries to persuade with many conjectures that Calvin denied the procession of the Son not in actual fact [non reipsa] but in his strange and improper way of speaking, for Calvin says the Son has the essence a se.”^[17] And indeed, on the Roman Catholic side, Bellarmine took the same line as Calvin on the Elohim. Referencing the opinion that the plural is in favor of the Trinity, Bellarmine divulges, “I do not think the argument is entirely solid, seeing that the habitual usage of Scripture seems to operate such that nouns of important persons are posited with the number of multitude, even though the verbs retain the singular number.”^[18] Cajetnaus, head of the Dominican order and among the Thomist princes of his day, argued similarly in his Genesis commentary;^[19] he would then be hacked at by his fellow Dominican Ambrosius Catherinus in scathing “annotations” (read: drive-by), titled Annotationes in commentaria Caietani… (It is one of the most shocking works against Cardinal Cajetan I have ever found; it is equally or more aggressive than polemical works by the Reformed/Lutherans against e.g. Bellarmine. I cannot believe it was written by a Dominican let alone actually published.)

Returning to the broader issue of Trinity in the Old Testament: similar to the diversity among Roman Catholics and Reformed, we find the same among Lutherans: some took one opinion and some the other. A smallish, important treatise, Georg Calixt’s De quaestionibus num mysterium sanctissimae trinitatis… (1649), argued for the negative, similar to Tostado; nonetheless, there were also works which took the affirmative: e.g., Scharfius’s Exercitationum theologicarum quarta de mysterio ss trinitatis and Calov’s Scriptura sacra veteris testamenti ss trinitatis revelatrix. Returning to Calixt, he focused primarily on showing that his was the consensus of the catholic church on the titular question--lengthy, but worth translating: “Whether ‘That the Trinity of persons of the one divine essence is,’ or, ‘That the one God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’ can be entirely and evidently demonstrated and shown from the statements and passages of the Old Testament alone, precluding the authority of the New, specifically when such is disputed with those who deny this mystery and do not admit the New Testament (e.g., the Jews); or, what amounts to the same: Whether the mystery of the Trinity of divine persons has been openly and clearly proposed in the books of the Old Testament, with the result that those who used, read, or heard these books read, could have considered and understood that the Trinity was proposed and revealed therein, and so been obligated to believe in the Trinity of persons or the divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit (for this question follows from the first).”^[20] Calixt answers, No. He assembles a litany of patristic, then scholastic authors and quotations as supporting authorities, pointing out the real distinction between Testaments which impedes the affirmative position. To name a few Calixt quotes from: Athanasius, Nazianzus, Isidorus, Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairveux, Hugh of St Victor--not to mention Thomas, Bonaventure, and Albertus Magnus (related questions were regularly treated in the commentary tradition, at III Sent d 25; then later, at Thomas’s ST II-II q 2 a 8). Calixt references Tostado, “a man utterly extraordinary in his time,”^[21] and closes with “Blessed Luther” in a smattering of very clear texts: Tostado and Luther are one on this issue. A line near the close of Calixt’s work, in sum: “Not any confession or formula [of faith] prescribes or teaches that one is to believe that all the faithful under the former covenant knew the Mystery of Trinity distinctly, or that this Mystery is completely expressed in the books of the Old Testament such that it could have been considered or understood by any therefrom, or even still today that [the Mystery] can be demonstrated and shown without the help of the New [Testament] against those who deny and do not receive the New [Testament]. Experience attests that this cannot be done; and if it might, who wants to run the risk?--so many doctors (mentioned above) from long ago attest [the contrary], from the deepest and noblest antiquity, and Blessed Luther attests the same.”^[22]

These two opinions were thoroughly worked and belabored in many books by many theologians for many decades throughout the catholic church; once again, as I am aware, it was the first debate of any magnitude on this question. Some held that the Trinity is not demonstrable from the Old Testament, some that it is; some focused on exegesis, some on church history and ecclesial authorities, some on the theological issues in play. Debates were layered, nuanced, revised, and fierce. Battles were fought by some of the greatest Hebraists of the age and by theologians whom I can only call rockstars and kings. The issue was important enough that suggestions of censure of various kinds were in the air. It was not a Protestant or Reformed or Lutheran and not a Roman Catholic or Dominican or Jesuit issue, but a catholic issue. It crossed all borders and involved many theologians whose allegiances varied on more minor issues but whose zeal was for nothing else but being orthodox on the doctrine of the holy Trinity, one point of universal agreement among others. I mention all this not to give a lesson on history, but to remind us of debates and their fruits from prior centuries on exactly the question and its relata we are considering today. The question and all its threads occupied our fathers; and every catholic theologian today can and must profit from this deposit of the holy catholic church. This is not to mention the almost embarrassing fact that all of these issues so thoroughly worked on and written about have their proposed resolutions and the explanations thereof immediately available to literally any Joe with an internet connection today.

Response to This Question: Sublating Both Opinions

From Tostado onward, there have been two opinions. One issues the negative judgment: The Trinity is not demonstrable from the Old Testament; the other, the affirmative judgment: The Trinity is demonstrable from the Old Testament. What is to be said in response?

These opinions, even though on the surface they seem to be diverse, nonetheless are not contrary, if one apprehends the respective insights from the causes for speaking in each way.^[23] The position of the catholic church utters both judgments and incorporates their respective insights, with all their threads, following the middle way. This can be seen by noting three things.

First, concerning God’s revelation of the Trinity in each Testament: the modes from which each Testament results are not in every way the same or univocal. This negation does not mean more or less in terms of quantity, but a distinction in some way through the mode of quality (per modum qualitatis). In other words, it is not only that we are told more about the Trinity in the New Testament than in the Old, in terms of “facts” or “bits of detail”; rather, we are told about the Trinity otherwise (aliter).

This real distinction of economies is irreducible and distributes throughout the theological science. As Thomas and all the High Medievals point out continually, our method or mode of proceeding (modus procendi)^[24] in the doctrine of the holy Trinity does nothing but reiterate the order (ordo) which was established according to God’s wisdom (sapientia), whereby out of his superabundant goodness (ex superabundanti bonitati) i.e. grace God revealed this Mystery not except in a way fitting (convenienter) to men, so that it was presented to us naturally (naturaliter), i.e. in line with our natures as men, who move from lower to higher by nature and so from lower to higher by knowledge:  “yes in actual fact within this [supernatural] revelation, in line with what is congruent to man, a certain order is maintained, such that man comes little by little from the imperfect to the perfect, just as occurs in other moveable [i.e., in some way material] things.”^[25] This is a cardinal element for the method of all teaching on the Trinity. It has many implications, one being that it has happened that God, because he is gracious, revealed himself in the Old Testament in a way fitting to us just as we were young and slaves to sin, in our lowest estate; and that God, because he is gracious, revealed himself in the New Testament in a way fitting to us just as we were mature and complete in Christ, in our highest estate. Whilst we lack the time to expand this thoroughly, that these two modes of revelation are not in every way the same is the clear teaching of holy Scripture in many places. Further, it is no minor, peripheral point; the logic of the two economies is touched by this.

Second, whilst really distinct, nonetheless, because these modes are not in every way different or equivocal, therefore they are in some way similar or analogical to each other. Sometimes, this is called the analogia scripturae or analogia fidei; here too, there is much underlying and many implications, but due to space we must move on.

Third, the analogy of the Old and New Testaments with respect to Trinity is adequately expressed by the phrase, “shadows and substance”: just as shadows to substance, just so the Old Testament to the New, with respect to the revelation of the Trinity. Further, it does not seem there is another analogy to express this, considering the reality itself; though there are many other expressions of this reality in other analogies (e.g., slaves versus sons, in Galatians), it does not seem they are expressing something other. The analogy is complex and many-layered. It stands behind the dictum among the fathers and doctors (mentioned by Dr. Sanders), as its ground: the Trinity is latent in the Old, patent in the New Testament, meaning that just as a shadow is the body latent and a body is the shadow patent, just so the revelation of the Trinity.

Here too, we must skip explaining this thoroughly for something more relevant. It is why this is the analogy for how the Testaments bear on the doctrine of the Trinity. This is because such is the analogy for how Christ is revealed, and Christ reveals the Trinity.

The underlying theology is deep and thrilling; but due to space, we must rely on authorities and settle for gestures only. Thomas illustrates the basic move. The supernatural authority which announces the opening of the trinitarian treatise is: “The Lord says, I have proceeded from God (John 8:42)” (ST I q 27 a 1 sed contra). Christ is the fulcrum on which God raises all knowledge of the Trinity, and all love. Christ confirms that the Trinity is and gives its explanation in sum. This is Thomas’s consistent position, shared with Bonaventura his brother and Albertus Magnus his father. These three, the greatest of the High Medievals and titans for all ages, each inaugurate their careers with prologues upon the Lombard’s Sententiae. There, they say it: Christ reveals the Trinity. Thomas’s focus is on this: “The Son of God has come, and since all the rivers [of wisdom] are contained in him, he has poured them out in a specific way by proclaiming the name of Trinity.”^[26] Bonaventura, his closest confrere and bosom soul, composes an icon or symbol, comparing the entire economy to flowing water. This effluxus, outpour or downpour of sacred rain, has as its cloud the eternal flux in divinis: the emanation of persons. It is these eternal waters, springing up from the Father’s bosom as the depths of eternal emanation (profundum aeternae emanationis)--it is these which fill up the Christ, the firmament between heaven above and the earth beneath, whose fissure and passion is compared to a sea which flows from his side to water the earth: “The passion of Christ is compared to a sea on account of the bitterness of his punishment and to rivers on account of the sweetness of his love. For the heart of Jesus Christ, so delectably sweet, so much so toward us, was affected by the softness of love…”^[27] Not just any waters, for the Son of God, generated eternally before all, then underwent incarnation as “nothing else but the generation of medicine.”^[28] This twofold procession or generation (dupliciter processio, to borrow from Thomas) make for healing waters, certain new theandric waters, to speak with Dionysius, Maximus, John of Damascene, and so on. And when this rock is struck, he pours out grace and with it the knowledge of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The wellspring in the Father eternally becomes “medicinal water” (medicinalis fluvius) for us and for our healing, to raise us like an upsurging tide until we behold Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Since “the nature of water is such that it ascends only insofar as it descends”^[29]; since the world will not rise until the Son has fallen, the eternal Son did not ascend without first descending even to death, thereby taking this and all up into his very own eternal generation, whose terminus is the full Sea of Divinity. Thus we are washed; thus we partake in God. The point is the same to what Thomas continually says: the grounding and motive force (ratio et causa) in the production and then supernatural return of creatures is the prior, eternal procession in God. This eternal motion from the Father unto perfect Sonship has us hooked into it, an act of the holy Trinity undividedly, so that we undergo this in our mode, until again we are sons of God. Similarly, Albertus Magnus, teacher of Thomas and doctor universalis, develops the underlying metaphysics: The eternal Son and every creature have this in common: accepting from God, the creature by participation in the prior acceptance of the Son eternally (per prius et posterius).^[30] Just so, accepting any revelation of the Trinity is not except by our participation in the prior acceptance of the Son, who has embraced and enfolded all knowledge of the Trinity out of eternity. Hence, the Son is not just the life of men, but even their light: “light, yes, light blazing over all things known, just as it is said in Psalm 109:3: “From the womb before the day star, I have begotten you, in the splendors of the saints.”^[31]

Thomas derives the conclusions: “The whole Trinity is said in the Word.”^[32] “In the name of Christ the whole Trinity is understood.”^[33] “Hence, I say that the Father is spoken, not as the Word, but as the thing said through the Word, and similarly for the Holy Spirit--because the Son manifests the whole Trinity. Hence, the Father speaks all three persons in his one Word.”^[34] We know God as Trinity in no way except as God has spoken. To borrow from Suarez,  “alone does the revelation through the testimony of the revealer and speaker remain [as an avenue]...It is necessary therefore that every revelation of this Mystery, which is ‘on the way’ i.e. outside the [beatific] intuitive vision of it, happens through the testification of revelation.”^[35] God has not spoken except in the Word, and that Word is Christ. Hence it is that we apprehend the Trinity not except insofar as we apprehend the Christ. And this is according to a twofold economy.

In the Old Testament, inasmuch as it presents us the Christ, just so much it presents us the Trinity. In the Old Testament, we learn God is one and the Messiah is coming from him; we later learn the procession of this one, this mission, is from the very heart of God out of eternity (John 1:18): the Son proceeds and so is sent, but not vice versa. We realize God is Trinity not except from the irruption of the visible mission of Christ in history, particularly its luminous acts (birth, death, resurrection), as it is signified before (Old Testament) and after (the New). The doctrine of the Trinity is the fruit of meditation on Christ in the full sweep of his contingent history, as this is mediated to us in holy Scripture.

In sum, these three points are as follows: (1) the modes of revelation are really distinct; (2) still, they are analogous; (3) the analogy is just as shadow to substance, because it is so with Christ. From this, it is clear why the two opinions mentioned above are not contrary to each other. On the one hand, Tostado and others take the negative opinion. They considered the real distinction, which impedes demonstration, taken properly. The Old Testament does not demonstrate, properly, that the Trinity is, because Christ reveals the Trinity, and the Old Testament speaks of Christ in shadow, not substance. Just as shadow alone cannot serve to brace a ladder, but only a full-grown tree, just so the Old Testament alone does not yet support our judgment that the Trinity is.

On the other hand, others take the affirmative opinion. They considered the real analogy, and the fact that the Old Testament has real bearing on the Trinity insofar as it has real bearing on Christ and is really ordered to the New Testament. This reality in and proper to the Old Testament itself does not in every way prevent that the Trinity is demonstrable from the Old Testament. And so it was said that the Trinity is demonstrable, not demonstrable properly but demonstrable in its widest usage, just as anything which makes something known in any way can be said to demonstrate it. Certain theologians out of zeal, it is true, because they did not consider the matter thoroughly, were hasty and fell into error, when they said that the Trinity is demonstrable from the Old Testament only. For this is not the case. The Old Testament does not bear on the judgment that the Trinity is, independent of Christ in the New Testament; but with the New Testament, the Trinity can be demonstrated and further explained from the Old Testament. Nonetheless, as the Medievals usually say, speaking of this as “a demonstration” should “not be extended, but piously expounded,” in order to prevent confusion on this point. Properly speaking, we are not to say that the Trinity is demonstrable from the Old Testament, but only that it is knowable from the Old Testament.

Nonetheless, whilst these opinions are not contrary, we must highlight a further distinction, especially operative in the affirmative opinion. The distinction must be distributed when we discuss the Trinity in the Old Testament. The distinction is between dogmatics and systematics mentioned above, between judging that it is (an sit) and understanding what it is (quid sit). This very distinction operates throughout early modern debates, though this is not always realized by current readers of said debates. On the one hand, speaking properly, the Old Testament, isolated from the New, does not demonstrate: this bears on the judgment that the Trinity is, a conclusion following upon principles. On the other hand, the Old Testament, isolated from the New, does illustrate: this bears on understanding what the Trinity is, by some analogy to what is with us and among creatures. As already mentioned, at times this understanding is mistakenly spoken of in probative terms, seeming to signify grounds for judgment; on the contrary, no understanding of the Trinity can be except upon the judgment of faith.

Tostado taught this well and, borrowing from Banez, “Abulensis’s wisdom is opposed way, way too much by modern theologians.”^[36] Tostado does not deny that the Trinity is knowable from the Old Testament, in terms of systematics and understanding; only in terms of dogmatics and judgment. Again, borrowing from Banez: “It is one thing to deny that the testimonies of the Old Testament are necessarily to be understood by catholics concerning the mystery of Trinity, but it is another thing to deny that the testimonies of the Old Testament can openly convince the Jews”^[37] The latter Tostado does deny, but the former Tostado does not deny--indeed, no significant theologian denies it that I am aware of. One can and should seek to understand the Trinity from the Old Testament, but one cannot and should not seek to demonstrate it.^[38]

In dogmatics, the Trinity is demonstrable from the New Testament and so from the Old Testament but not vice versa. With those who do accept in some way the supernatural authority of the Old but in no way of the New, the Trinity is not demonstrable. What is demonstrable, and what should be the focus then for argument? What should we seek to engender affirmative judgment of as a conclusion of the sacred text?: that Jesus is the Christ, and so has supernatural authority and speaks the truth that the Trinity is, as Tostado, Calixt, and many others have explained. To conclude with Banez, in this scenario, “the best means of aid is what Abulensis asserted: we priorly show them out of the Old Testament, Jesus is the true Messiah...and then ultimately they believe what Christ has preached is true, and ipso facto the veil will be lifted from their eyes, and they will understand the Mysteries which are latent in the Old Testament.”^[39]

We must be aware then that whenever we find Christ himself or his apostles take the Old Testament to demonstrate something of the Trinity, this is not except resting upon the prior authority of Christ himself. Similarly, in dogmatic order, whenever the fathers and doctors of the holy catholic church treat the Old Testament similarly, it is not except with the authority handed to them from Christ and the apostles, never demonstrating the Trinity from the Old Testament in isolation from the New. Whenever they consider the Trinity in the Old Testament, they are either demonstrating, pushing for judgment, on the authority of Christ in the New Testament behind them; or they are explaining, pushing for understanding, what the Trinity is.

This latter treatment, the systematic order and understanding, is where many get confused. For example, some assume mistakenly, not only today but also throughout the centuries, that when “suadere/persuadere,” “probabilis,” and the like are used in these contexts, they have a probative force (for judgment/grounds thereof) rather than explanatory force (for understanding/analogy thereof). When Tostado and others say we can from the Old Testament “persuade the plurality of persons”; when Richard of St Victor and many others seek for the rationes (“reasons,” better translated similitudes or analogies here) in the natural order, this is not except (1) posterior to faith and supernatural revelation of the Trinity in the New Testament and (2) explanatory only. It does not backwash to initiate or support faith’s judgment but overflows as faith’s understanding. Credo ut intelligam: I believe in order to understand, not vice versa. Whatever is known of the Trinity from the Old Testament in isolation from the New requires (1) the prior judgment of faith that the Trinity is and (2) contributes to the “some understanding” (aliqua intelligentia) which Vatican I taught we can acquire.

In the systematic order and understanding, we can sort the Old Testament’s revelation of the Trinity into two categories. One is appropriations, and the other is certain names whose perfection signified is enclosed in what Christ proposes: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. An example of the latter is “wisdom,” “word,” as well as “son,” in their meanings developed throughout the Old Testament; these are englobed and recapitulated into capitals “Wisdom,” “Word,” and “Son,” when we accept Christ as God. An example of the former, appropriations, is things like the issue of Elohim.

We pause a moment on Elohim, because it features in Dr. Leithart’s essay. I alluded to the Protestant/Reformed debate on whether Elohim is only a “plural of majesty” or a “plural properly” (proprie); similar debates, though I believe less wide-ranging, occurred with Roman Catholics. In my opinion, two things are to be said. One, in the dogmatic order, just as was said above, properly speaking it does not demonstrate the Trinity or anything of the Trinity.^[40] Two, in the systematic order, it is not in every way impossible to use Elohim to explain something of the Trinity and acquire understanding thereof, by appropriation. (This assumes the plural is indeed not only a “plural of majesty.”) Appropriation is nothing else but taking something essential and intending it toward something personal. As Albertus Magnus says in a finely turned phrase, appropriation is an “approach in the neighborhood” (accessum vicinitatis) of the divine person. Here, we must remember what Cajetanus says: “‘To be appropriated’ does not signify ‘to become proper.’ This is because essential things cannot become proper to any person; rather, ‘to be appropriated’ signifies ‘to be accommodated or adapted,’ as the doctors [of the church] frequently do, when they attribute ‘wisdom’ to the Son, because he is the Word.”^[41]

Elohim can be appropriated for some understanding of Trinity, not properly but improperly. Properly, appropriation involves essential names in the essence formally; such names are appropriable to one of the persons. For example, power, wisdom, and love are formally in the divine essence, identically each of the divine persons really (secundum rem), but nonetheless because of their respective formalities (propriae rationes) each is appropriable to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. We do not want to get off track, but one can do this with a disanalogy of proper proportionality, a disanalogy and analogy of proper proportionality, and an analogy of proper proportionality. For the Father: just as power is not in a human father (because he is old and decrepit), not just so (dissimilarly) power is in the Father. For the Son: just as wisdom is not in a son (on account of youth and immaturity), not just so (dissimilarly) wisdom is in the Son; or, just as wisdom is in our word, just so wisdom is in the Son. For the Holy Spirit: just as love is in our spirit, just so it is in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the mode of will from Father and Son. Nonetheless, appropriation can extend beyond this proper type in many ways. For example, improperly, appropriation involves essential names in the essence not formally, but only eminently; such names are appropriable to one of the persons or more than one. Such names are only eminently in the divine essence, identically each of the divine persons really (secundum rem), but nonetheless because of their respective formalities can be accommodated to explain something of the Trinity. And if Elohim is in any way for understanding the Trinity, then it is not except by this improper appropriation. Just as power, wisdom, and love are formally in the essence and appropriable to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit individually, just so multiplicity, signified by “Elohim,” is eminently in the essence and appropriable to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit collectively.

Again, this improper appropriation assumes that Elohim is not only a plural of majesty, but in some way a “proper plural.”^[42] Nevertheless, in either case, it is not except an essential name and in the essence of God. Whilst it is unhelpful for many people to be aware of this due to its complexity, God transcends unity and multiplicity and has beforehand the perfections in both, to quote from Dionysius and the Liber de causis.^[43] Just as personality, so the perfection of plurality is or can be understood to be in God according to essence, even when we exclude the Trinity, just as the Jews and Muslims believe.^[44] In the Old Testament, any revelation of “plurality” or what amounts to “plurality” in God is not except something in the essence of God eminently and so appropriable to the Trinity of persons plural (formally) in light of New Testament revelation.^[45]

Summary Comments on the Present Conversation

Speaking generally now, I offer a few comments in direct reflection on the essays of this conversation.

Similar to sentiments expressed by Dr. Sonderegger and Dr. Sanders, I too am delighted by “motivated rereading” (Sanders’ phrase) that Dr. Leithart exhibits (similarly, for the essay by Dr. Smith). I welcome the profit that comes from this; as a systematic, not biblical theologian, this firms up my weaknesses and covers my mistakes. I flag, briefly, that like Dr. Sonderegger, I disagree with the position Dr. Leithart’s essay seems to perhaps as far as I can see imply: that other monotheist religions, e.g., Jews and Muslims, do not worship the same God as Christians. I affirm the contrary: they in fact most assuredly do. (I leave this aside, but mention it because I think my early divergence explains subsequent disagreements.) Notwithstanding, this does not undercut Leithart’s central task of teaching the Trinity from the Old Testament. In light of its pronouncement from the mouth of Christ, we know that the Trinity is, and the Old Testament serves to demonstrate this in conjunction with the New; further, the Old Testament on its own can serve to explain the Trinity, upon the judgment of faith.

Like Dr. Sanders, I believe it is best to gear our teaching such that we embrace “adumbration” and “revelation” (Sanders’ words) and distribute this thoroughly in the theological science. This is a difficult trick and requires purposefulness when teaching; but these firm handles mark the fact of distinction between Testaments and give some understanding as to its kind. I myself instill this very tension in people, at risk of frustrating them, because I believe that refusing to altogether resolve this tension is not a weakness, but a strength. The Old Testament begs for and so tips toward its own completion in Christ. Reiterating that in ourselves is crucial; it causes us to converge upon Christ and through him irrupt into Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

One point more I wish to offer, not a “caution” so much as a principle for distribution, when using the Old Testament to gain or give some understanding of the holy Trinity. I express this principle in what I expect is a false dichotomy: the revelation of the Trinity is not in the mere fact of distinction, neither in various facets of its kind; it is in the relative names “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit.”

What does this mean?--let me extend my false dichotomy. The doctrine of the Trinity is not the formalized expression of holy Scripture’s use of grammatically plural nouns or plural verbs for God, its signification of multiple speakers, dramatic inner self-dialogues, and the like. Holy Scripture, divinely inspired most assuredly, still is itself a creature, sanctified, put to use as an instrument to reveal. Sanctified, put to use, as an instrument, to reveal, are all words with God as subject or better things with God as agent. Notwithstanding, as a creature, holy Scripture is beset--a word unfitting to the sacred texts--holy Scripture is beset with creatureliness, whilst still wielded inexorably by God himself for the end that he is known. Assimilating holy Scripture as the principle of knowledge of this one who is speaking, necessitates that we remove the creaturely mode that accompanies revelation. Holy Scripture imposes this removal upon us; it is no strategem of human devising. When we read and receive, Scripture gives (positive) the Divinity and takes (negative) the creaturely mode away: both affirmations and negations are effects of God revealing. To undergo the removal, just as we embrace the positive gift, we must enact the very negations in the text of holy Scripture. These negations are signified sometimes as actual (when it is written, “God is not this”); sometimes only as virtual, where we accept God is not something either by incorporating an actual negation from elsewhere or deducing the virtual negation from anywhere in holy Scripture. Reiterating these negatives is no less an act of humbly listening to the sacred texts and hearing God than feasting on affirmatives. These negatives involve sorting plurals and removing all plurality insofar as this removal is not impeded. In the doctrine of Trinity, where we confess three persons, what stops us is not plurality or multitude signified in creaturely words bare and cold, but Scripture’s affirmation in God of the relative names, “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit.” When we reflect on each relation qua relation, there is derived “not the subject of this relation, but another as term”: real distinction at this very site. We are not brought to confess real distinction or multitude of persons, because we are told “real distinction is in God,” or “really distinct ones are in God,” perhaps signified by “Elohim” or other related names. Rather, we confess the Trinity because holy Scripture makes us affirm that the Father is, that the Son is, that the Holy Spirit is. There is no absolute distinction in God, no unqualified distinction, no abstract distinction, and, if I can say it, no relative distinction in God, by which I mean “relatives” in the abstract as some metaphysical “pieceage” floating about, indefinite, in God. All of these, especially the first, are tended to, if we consider distinction detached from the place where God had marked it: at the concrete relations paternity, filiation, and passive spiration, signified by “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit.” It is these relations of origin, as the catholic church has always said: the concretely defined relations founded upon origin and “colored” thereby. Absent these, outside these, before and after these, all is one, except at these, whereat we are impeded from removing plurality. “​​Est una substantia una essentia, una natura, una divinitas, una immensitas una aeternitas omniaque sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio” (Council of Florence; DS 1330): there is one substance, one essence, one nature, one divinity, one immensity, one eternity, all are one and one only!--wherever the opposed relation (yes, even singular!) does not prevent (non obviat) this absolute reduction of all plurality to unity. Wherever else, all other plurality is reduced to absolute simplicity, for God is one.

I underline: what impedes our removal of plurality is not a random choice, a guess, a holdover from Greek philosophy. It is nothing human, but something divine: God speaking in holy Scripture. Our act of negating, our act of ceasing negating, our act of affirming, and the things negated, not negated, and affirmed, are all our utterance a second time of what God has uttered the first. As Dionysius says and the High Medievals, especially Thomas, never tire of saying, especially in the doctrine of the Trinity, where Thomas repeats this many times, because the Trinity is not known in any way except in supernatural revelation: “With no qualifications, we cannot dare to say, no, not even to think something of the supersubstantial and hidden deity beyond those things which have been divinely expressed to us from the holy utterances.”^[46] No theologians of the catholic church move or act in any way except God has moved them by his books.

In his books, we are given “the who as distinct and the distinct as who,” at the concrete names “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit.” Multitude or plurality emanates, just as risibility from man, not except from these relations; otherwise, it is removed. This is central, and so I underline it again: we do not remove but retain the consequent plurification that must be afterwards acknowledged when we subsequently reflect upon the real opposed relations God has told us are in him. It is this we must remember in the laudable motivation to (re)read holy Scripture, including the Old Testament. This is praiseworthy and I support this task. Yet it must be done only to expound Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The great danger of motivated rereading is neglecting its one-directional character. I worry at times a motivated rereading of the Old Testament can encode us with an idea of Trinity that has taken the edifice and ground it to powder. This can happen, also unintentionally, if we overplay our hand: the product is an overwrought portrait of Elohim and deflated idea of Trinity, instead of an inflated insight into Trinity, by way of support from Elohim. When we using the Old Testament in this way, we must realize we are in the order of teaching or learning (ordo docendi), deriving the actuality or perfection of insight from the complete revelation in Christ.

Far better, it seems to me, to follow the tradition which the High Medievals developed from the fathers and the neoscholastics brought to term. This tradition confessed there are not except five notions. Taken adequately, these are the reduction of all supernatural revelation of the holy Trinity. The notions were not an attempt to master the Mystery or massage it to human size; they were not “reductive” or “simplistic,” meant pejoratively: here, reducing means to boil down to crystals or compress coal to diamonds. The possibility for such condensing arises from the fact that nothing of Trinity is known except from supernatural revelation. Its production was the fruit of centuries of reflection on the whole of revelation as written, with the light of the Holy Spirit as guide; of digestion by hundreds and hundreds of saints; and of exacting distillation performed by the fathers and doctors, who realized there were five central elements, supercharged with light like little suns. Two are no concern here (innascibility and active spiration); but three are called personal properties or notions constituting persons: paternity, filiation, and passive spiration, sometimes called procession. They are personal properties, because they englobe the universe of supernatural revelation of the Trinity, in (1) its positive and (2) its immediate form. I can define what man is, by saying he is not a rock, and by saying he has feet; but the one is not positive, and the other is not central to what he is. Paternity, filiation, and passive spiration then are the three headers of all exposition. And crucially, when we expound or explain them, there is “addition” in the order of learning, but technically this is only unpacking what was already contained in these notions. Other names and descriptors express various aspects (rationes), but they all discharge the light, rather than infuse “paternity,” “filiation,” and “passive spiration” with light to start with. It is here where the Old Testament must be slotted. It is subordinate to and useful for unloading what is in these names “Father,” “Son,” and “Spirit” God has named himself with. “Named himself? In some kind of extrinsic, artificial way?” No, not at all; when God freely wills to reveal himself, our minds are turned to face him; these names, expressing the innards of things, cascade from our mouths and burst into our minds as the streams we imbibe, for God has poured out the Living Waters he is before we are.

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Ryan Hurd is a doctoral student at the Theologische Universiteit Kampen.

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^[1] Thomas, In Boethii de Trinitate, proem. Modus autem de Trinitate tractandi duplex est, ut dicit Augustinus in I de Trinitate, scilicet per auctoritates et per rationes, quem utrumque modum Augustinus complexus est, ut ipsemet dicit. Thomas, In Boethii de Trinitate, proem. Boethius vero elegit prosequi per alium modum, scilicet per rationes, praesupponens hoc quod ab aliis per auctoritates fuerat prosecutum.

^[2] “Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie querit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur, tum ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia tum e mysteriorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo; numquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum, quae proprium eius obiectum constituunt” (DS 1796).

^[3] “Non tamen est idem perfectionis modus humanae et divinae, quia non potest tanta esse similitudo inter creatorem et creaturam, quin maior inveniatur ibi dissimilitudo, propter hoc quod creatura in infinitum distat a Deo.” Thomas, Super Decretales no 2.

^[4] Consider e.g., “In dialogo oecumenico theologi catholici, doctrinae Ecclesiae inhaerentes, una cum fratribus seiunctis investigationem peragentes de divinis mysteriis, cum veritatis amore, caritate et humilitate progredi debent. In comparandis doctrinis meminerint existere ordinem seu hierarchiam veritatum doctrinae catholicae, cum diversus sit earum nexus cum fundamento fidei christianae. Sic via sternetur qua per fraternam hanc aemulationem omnes incitentur ad profundiorem cognitionem et clariorem manifestationem investigabilium divitiarum Christi.” Decr oec “unitatis redintegratio.” And again: “Divina enim mysteria suapte natura intellectum sic excedunt, ut etiam revelatione tradita et fide suscepta ipsius tamen fidei velamine contecta et quadam quasi caligine obvoluta maneant, quamdiu in hac mortali vita, ‘peregrinamur a Domino…’” DS 3016.

^[5] Christus complevit mysterium. Thomas, I Sent prol.

^[6] “Cognitio enim Trinitatis in unitate est fructus et finis totius vitae nostrae.” Thomas, I Sent d 2 exp.

^[7] Consider his many commentaries thereon, published in Venice 1507–47.

^[8] Auctoritates Veteris Testamenti persuadent Trinitatem personarum. Tostado, Opuscula, “De sanctissima trinitate.”

^[9] Ex auctoritatibus veteris testamenti personarum pluralitas, licet sit persuasibilis, necessario tamen non est convincibilis.” Tostado, Opuscula, “De sanctissima trinitate,” prima conclusio.

^[10] Licet ex scripturis veteris testamenti possit probari personarum divinarum pluralitas, nullo modo tamen probari potest distincte trinitas.” Tostado, Opuscula, “De sanctissima trinitate,” secunda conclusio.

^[11] In novo testamento manifestissime probatur personarum trinitas, ita ut suscepta lege evangelica impossibile sit alicui negare trinitatem personarum. Tostado, Opuscula, “De sanctissima trinitate,” tertia conclusio.

^[12] Ex his sequitur correlarium, scilicet contra Iudaeos perfidos, quandiu manent in suo errore cuilibet fideli sapienti, vel ignaro de personarum trinitate periculosum est arguere.” Tostado, Opuscula, “De sanctissima trinitate,” tertia conclusio.

^[13] Sed, qui vult contra Hebraeos disputare, debet conari solum, ut probet Messiam in lege promissum venisse, & quod ille habebat potestatem dandi legem novam, & quod illi tenebantur omnes homines assentire, quae satis possunt induci auctoritatibus veteris testamenti, quo facto compelletur Iudaeus ex lege veteri tenere legem Evangelicam. Et tamen si illam susceperit, assentiet omnibus articulis eius, & non oportebit, quod probentur, nec in hoc laboremus.” Tostado, Opuscula, “De sanctissima trinitate,” tertia conclusio. Especially surrounding these last two comments, Tostado, though he does not mention it, is clearly influenced by Thomas, commenting on dealing with unbelievers in ST I q 32 a 1, and shapes his statements accordingly.

^[14] Postillae litteralis super Bibliam, “Utrum ex scripturis a Iudeis receptis possit efficaciter probari salvatorem nostrum fuisse Deum et hominem.”

^[15] “Hoc dubium movetur a nobis, eo quod Abulensis in quadaem repeititione, quae de trinitate inscribitur, dicit aliquid propter quod vehementer reprehenditur a Theologis nostri temporis.” Banez, In ST I q 32 a 1.

^[16] Hunnius, Calvinus iudaizans, hoc est: iudaicae glossae et corruptele: quibus Iohannes Calvinus illustrissima scripturae sacrae loca et testimonia, de gloriosa trinitate, deitate Christi, et Spiritus Sancti, cum primis autem vaticinia prophetarum de adventu messaie, nativitate eius, passione, resurrectione, ascensione in coelos et sessione ad dextram dei, detestandum in modum corrumpere non exhorruit. Addita est corruptelarum confutatio. 1593.

^[17] “Hanc haeresim Genebrard lib 1 de Trinit in med tribuit Calvino & Bezae, suspicaturque Franciscum Stancarum authorem primum huius haeresis fuisse. Bellarminus autem tom 1 lib 2 de Christo cap 19 multis coniecturis suadere nititur, Calvinum non reipsa, sed modo loquendi absurdo & improprie negase processionem Filii: ait Calvinus Filium habere a se essentiam.” Montoya, De trin, q 27 a 1 disp 1 sectio 1.

^[18] “Sed non puto argumentum esse admodum solidum, siquidem Scripturae consuetudo id habere videtur, ut nomina illustrium personarum ponantur in numero multitudinis, licet verba retineant numerum singularum.” Bellarmine, Disputationum de controversiiss christianae fidei (1588), 383–84.

^[19] Cajetanus, In pentateucham mosis iuxta sensum quem dicunt literalem commentarii, 1531.

^[20] “Quaeritur, Num trinitas personarum unius essentiae divinae, sive quod unus Deus sit Pater, Filius & Sanctus Spiritus, e dictis & locis solius Veteris testamenti, seclusa auctoritate Novi, quando videlicet contra eos, qui mysterium hoc negant, & Novum non admittunt, quales Iudaei sunt, disputatur, solide & evidenter demonstrari & evinci possit: sive, quod eodem recidit, Num mysterium trinitatis personarum divinarum in libris Veteris testamenti aperte & perspicue fuerit propositum, ut qui illis uterentur, & legerent aut praelegi audirent, id ibi a Deo proponi & revelari potuerint animadverte & intelligere; atque adeo obligati fuerint, ut trinitatem personarum, sive diviniatem Filii & Sancti Spiritus crederent. Posterius enim sequitur e priore.” Calixt, De quaestionibus num mysterium sanctissimae trinitatis

^[21] Vir sui aevi plane eximius. Calixt, De quaestionibus num mysterium sanctissimae trinitatis…, thesis 11.

^[22] Nec ulla vel Confessio vel Formula praescribit aut docet, credendum esse quod omnes prisci foederis fideles mysterium Trinitatis distincte cognoverint, aut quod idipsum in libris Veteris testamenti ita exprimatur, ut a quovis tunc potuerit animadverti & intelligi, sive etiam hodie absque adminiculo Novi adversus eos, qui negent & Novum non recipiant, demonstrari & evinci. Non posse, testabitur experientia, si sit, qui facere velit periculum; testantur tot a nobis pridem producti ex summa & ima antiquitate doctoreres; testatur B Lutherus.” Calixt, De quaestionibus num mysterium sanctissimae trinitatis…, thesis 20.

^[23] Thomas, I Sent d 2 q 1 a 3 resp. Hae autem opiniones, quamvis in superficie diversae videantur, tamen non sunt contrariae, si quis dictorum rationes ex causis assumit dicendi.

^[24] As Lombard puts it in his I Sent d 2, where it is dealt with in the medieval tradition: Quis ordo sit servandus, cum de Trinitate agitur: what order is maintained, when we deal with Trinity?

^[25] Sed quia perfectum hominis bonum est ut quoquo modo Deum cognoscat, ne tam nobilis creatura omnino in vanum esse videretur, velut finem proprium attingere non valens, datur homini quaedam via per quam in Dei cognitionem ascendere possit: ut scilicet, quia omnes rerum perfectiones quodam ordine a summo rerum vertice Deo descendunt, ipse, ab inferioribus incipiens et gradatim ascendens, in Dei cognitionem proficiat; nam et in corporalibus motibus eadem est via qua descenditur et ascenditur, ratione principii et finis distincta…. Quia igitur debilis erat Dei cognitio ad quam homo per vias praedictas intellectuali quodam quasi intuitu pertingere poterat, ex superabundanti bonitate, ut firmior esset hominis de Deo cognitio, quaedam de seipso hominibus revelavit quae intellectum humanum excedunt. In qua quidem revelatione, secundum congruentiam hominis, quidam ordo servatur, ut paulatim de imperfecto veniat ad perfectum: sicut in ceteris rebus mobilibus accidit. Thomas, SCG IV c 1.

^[26] Venit filius Dei et inclusa flumina quodammodo effudit, nomen Trinitatis publicando. Thomas, I Sent prologus.

^[27] Passio Christi comparatur mari propter poenalitatis amaritudinem, sed et flumini propter caritatis dulcedinem. Dulcissimum enim cor Iesu Christi tanta circa [erga] nos afficiebatur teneritudine amoris… Bonaventura, I Sent prologus.

^[28] Incarnatio enim Filii Dei nihil aliud fuit quam generatio medicamenti. Bonaventura, I Sent prologus.

^[29] Natura aquae haec est, quod tantum ascendit, quantum descendit. Bonaventura, I Sent prologus.

^[30] Quoting from Basil: “Accipere naturam Filio cum omni creatura commune est, habere autem naturaliter proprium est eius, quia ex natura est Patris. Per aliam autem partem supponitur creatura in proprio genere, scilicet, in se per nomen creaturae…” Albertus Magnus, I Sent prologus.

^[31] “Lux, inquam, irradians super omnia cognita: sicut dicit, Psal CIX 3: Ex utero ante luciferum genui te, in splendoribus sanctorum…” Albertus Magnus, I Sent prologus.

^[32] Tota trinitas verbo dicatur. Thomas, ST q 34 a 1 ad 3.

^[33] in Christi nomine tota Trinitas intelligitur. IV Sent d 3 q 1 a 2 qc 2 ad 3.

^[34] Dico igitur, quod pater dicitur, non sicut verbum, sed sicut res dicta per verbum; et similiter spiritus sanctus, quia filius manifestat totam Trinitatem; unde pater dicit verbo uno suo omnes tres personas. Thomas, De ver q 4 a 2 ad 3.

^[35] Solum ergo relinquitur revelatio per testimonium revelantis, seu loquentis. Nam manuductio aliqua per rationes probabiles parvi momenti esse potest ad generandum assensum, nisi fides prius supponatur, ut mox dicemus. Oportet ergo, ut omnis revelatio huius mysterii, quae sit viae, seu extra visionem intuitivam eius, fiat per testificationem revelationis.” Suarez, De sanctissimo trinitatis mysterio, l 1 c 12 sect 3, page 570r.

^[36] Sapientia Abulen plus nimio reprehenditur a moderni. Banez, In ST I q 32 a 1.

^[37] “Aliud enim est negare testimonia veteris testamentis esse necessario intelligenda de mysterio trinitatis a Cahtolicis, & aliud [negare] illa possint aperte convincere Iudaeum.” Banez, In ST I q 32 a 1.

^[38] One should be aware that we are then in a situation similar to the use of natural theology (e.g., what can be apprehended from the human soul) in order to gain some understanding of this Mystery of faith. In no way does this seek to demote the Old Testament to being a half-way house between the supernatural theology in the New Testament and natural theology in the natural order; much less does it seek to demote the Old Testament to being purely natural theology. By no means; the Old Testament is supernatural theology, but it is not in every way perfect and complete, as the New Testament--and in this it is in some way similar to natural theology, which is not in every way perfect and complete in order to supernatural theology (whether in the Old Testament or the New).

^[39] “Unde optimum remedium est quod Abulensis asservit, ut prius ostendamus illis ex veteri testamento Iesum esse verum Messiam…& deinde credant esse vera, quae Christus praedicavit, & tunc auferetur velamen ab oculis eorum, & intelligent mysteria, quae latent in veteri testamento.” Banez, In ST I q 32 a 1.

^[40] This would include, e.g., the judgment affirming plurality is (formally) in God, because this judgment is subsequent the judgment affirming real distinction, and so on.

^[41] “Appropriari non significat “proprium fieri,” quoniam essentialia nulli Personae possunt fieri propria: sed significat accommodari et adaptari, ut consueverunt Doctores facere, attribuentes sapientiam Filio, quia est Verbum, etc.” Cajetan, In ST I q 39 a 7.

^[42] A generous footnote is in order. By plural of majesty or “plural proprie,” “plural properly taken,” I am simply adopting the phrases as they frequent the debates among the sixteenth/seventeenth-century Reformed on this precise textual issue. One must note clearly that proprie, as the Reformed are using it in this context, is not in every way the same as proprie as it is usually used among the Medievals in the contexts of doctrine of God (whether de deo uno or de deo trino). The question among the Reformed operates primarily in terms of grammar or types of discourse: metaphorical discourse (plural of majesty) or “literal” discourse (plural proprie); but adopting the latter, we must then ask whether the perfection signified literally (directly) is in God formally (proprie) or eminently (improprie), as the Medievals and neoscholastics would say. For some Reformed, Elohim is a plural proprie, literal plural; “proprie” means non-metaphorical or not purely figurative in the sense derived from negating the “mere” plural of majesty option: it means “not merely plural of majesty,” but does not address what proprie properly means in terms of formally or eminently, i.e. how such a perfection, literally signified, is in God. In such a context, affirming proprie abstracts entirely from the additional and essential question of whether the multiplicity, signified by Elohim, is formally or eminently in God. Among the Medievals, it is on condition of the former which allows one to mean multiplicity proprie. And in that way it is to be denied that the Elohim texts et relata are affirming multiplicity proprie, i.e. formally in God. Rather, it is multiplicity eminently, just as God transcends being itself and all its passions, among which is multiplicity (as a transcendental, not as a number). Nonetheless, this is still more than (“not merely”) a plural of majesty, and hence it is that in the tradition it can be conceded that Elohim is a plural properly affirmed of God, but that this is a saying about the divine essence, and in no way about the plurality formally in God on account of the real distinction of persons--just as I am saying here. Note that this has been a point of significant confusion in the tradition for centuries, especially bridging from the Medievals to the neoscholastics/Reformed orthodox on this and related questions. To put it obnoxiously, proprie can mean proprie, properly or improprie, improperly: the former is formaliter, formally, just as we say God understands, whereas the latter is eminenter, eminently, just as we say God reasons. And the latter would be in the essence, identically each divine person, an “attribute” which can be appropriated to the Trinity. The point is that if one concedes that Elohim is not only a plural of majesty in Genesis, in no way does this imply that the text intends to communicate that multiplicity is formally in God (as we can say, given New Testament revelation), only that the text intends to communicate that multiplicity is eminently in God just as all the transcendentals are eminently in God. Note that the New Testament is very frequently, when it cites Old Testament texts, engaging in a very rigorous (not to mention inspired) form of appropriation. In such cases, it is saying (1) such Old Testament revelation is appropriable, because (2) there is something really in God to appropriate to: Father, Son, and Spirit. It is (2) whereby the New Testament reveals that the Trinity is and then shows how it is latent in the Old, just as e.g. power, wisdom, and love are appropriable to the divine persons on supposition of knowledge that the Trinity is, revealed in the New Testament.

^[43] Obviously we are not speaking of one and many through the mode of number, of course, but transcendentally.

^[44] Ad secundum dicendum quod, etiam circumscriptis per intellectum personalitatibus trium personarum, remanebit in intellectu una personalitas Dei, ut Iudaei intelligunt, ad quam poterit terminari assumptio, sicut nunc dicimus eam terminari ad personam verbi. Thomas, ST III q 3 a 3 ad 2.

^[45] To say this properly requires many very fine distinctions, which I am leaving to one side.

^[46] I am just translating from the Latin because I am lazy and do not like to type diacritics: “Igitur universaliter non est audendum dicere aliquid nec etiam cogitare de supersubstantiale et occulta deitate, praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sanctis eloquiis sunt expressa.” Consider Thomas’s commentary on this point, in De div nom c 1 lect 1.

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