Farr again, commenting on the case of Abdul Rahman who was convicted of apostasy in Afghanistan, sentenced to death, and released after U.S. pressure. This all came after the Afghanistan had, with U.S. support, adopted a constitution: “The Afghan constitution was heralded as a major step [toward democracy] . . . . It created a presidential system, a parliament elected by universal adult suffrage, and an independent judiciary. It guaranteed free expression and equality under the law.” It explicitly declared Afghanistan’s commitment to protect “human rights, and dignity” and to ensure “the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people.” The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan stated that while the constitution made Islam the state religion, “the document provides broad religious freedom - allowing adherents of other faiths to practice their religions and observe religious rites.”

Farr argues that the reality was otherwise.

“In fact, the constitution had not guaranteed religious freedom. For non-Muslims it protected the right ‘to perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the law. In Afghanistan,’ the constitution noted pointedly, ‘no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam . . . .’ this was a pinched version of religious freedom indeed, a ‘right to rites,’ as one observer wryly noted. It wasn’t much better than what non-Muslims were permitted to do in Saudi Arabia, which was to worship in private.” For some in the State Department, this was enough. If non-Muslims were free to pray and worship, why did they want more? Some said that objections to the constitution’s provisions regarding religious freedom were veiled efforts to make room for missionaries to move in.

Farr observes too that the problem extends beyond minorities: “Afghanistan was not moving toward the kind of democracy that would contain Islamist radicalism and remain stable. The constitution had created a window through which extremism could lawfully enter, contend with the reformers and the moderates, and stand an excellent change of defeating them. In fact, no one had true religious freedom in Afghanistan, including the Sunni and Shiite Muslims that constituted 99 percent of the population. Like the others, they were generally free to perform rites - to worship and attend to the private imperatives of Islam. They could attend mosques and follow the pillars of their religion . . . . [but] there were compelling reasons for Muslims (let alone non-Muslims) not to express themselves publicly on Islam, its proper relationship with the state, and its value to democratic stability. The courts had virtually unchecked power to decide what the undefined values of Islam were, and to apply them in the Afghan public square.”

U.S. officials generally did not buy this argument: “In endless discussions of the ‘war of ideas’ raging within Islam, they saw the issue of religious freedom in Afghanistan as largely irrelevant.” Farr identifies the secular mindset of American diplomacy as a key factor, in that it blinds Americans to the role of religion around the world. Ironically, this secular mindset leaves the door open for tolerance, Afghan style.