In his Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle (Oxford Aristotle Studies) , p. 173, Andres Rosler questions whether gratitude for the benefits of socialization are enough to obligate someone to obey the regime in which he was socialized. Is gratitude sufficient basis for political obligations? Rosler says No, and explains:

“considerations of gratitude or based on social debts, together with indications of our social and cultural nature, would not be per se of much help to explain political bonds. This is something we should have in mind when reading Aristotle’s speech argument for his political naturalism (Pol. I.2 1253a7–19). This argument in itself shows that we are political animals, not that we ought to obey the authority of the polis we happen to be in (2.4). First of all, we may well participate in the polis ( koin?nein pole?s ) in different forms without taking part in politics ( sumpoliteuesthai ), as VII.2 1324a15 seems to indicate. So the mere fact that M is a member of the polis T does not make him a participant in its political game. M may well be a member of the polis T in the sense that M has learned Greek thanks to the education given by T, which happens to be a tyrannical regime. But it does not follow (a) that M ought to educate his children
with a view to T nor (b) that M is morally required to obey T’s authority. The fact that M has benefited from learning a language and/or that M has accepted the rules of language does not entail that M has to obey T. Aristotle does not claim that since we depend on the polis for all cultural or linguistic purposes then we ought to obey its authority (7.4).”

He elaborates on contemporary debates concerning gratitude and political obligation in a footnote:

“Nozick . . . has a point in saying that ‘the fact that we partially are “social products” in that we benefit from current patterns and forms created by the multitudinous actions of a long string of long-forgotten people, forms which include institutions, ways of doing things, and language (whose social nature may involve our current use depending upon Wittgensteinian matching of the speech of others), does not create in us a general floating debt which the current society can collect and use as it will’. Cf. Caliban’s chiding of Miranda: ‘You taught me language, and my profit on’t | Is I know how to curse’ ( The Tempest , I.ii.361–2). Similarly, Charles Taylor’s influential ‘social thesis’ is right to place Aristotle’s political naturalism within the communitarian movement according to which ‘living in society is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being.’ . . . But it does not necessarily follow from Taylor’s conclusion that the individual has an obligation to belong to and/or obey the political authority of the particular society from which he benefited in this way. A tyranny may well have been instrumental to the development of my moral capacities and yet it seems that I may sensibly defy it. As Green . . . says, ‘We need to establish, not just that the free individual is a product of a certain kind of society and therefore must support the social conditions of such freedom, but also that such support is not possible, or not complete, without conceding the moral authority of the state.’”

Rosler thinks that the argument is a complex of three issues: “At the end of the day, there are at least three issues at stake: (a) the argument of gratitude in favour of political obligation, (b) the Hegelian argument of the impossibility of valuing freedom without accepting the authority of the state . . . and (c) the argument that human beings are cultural creatures.”