Patrick Fitzgerald argues in an extensive and careful analysis of “Gratitude and Justice” in a 1998 issue of Ethics that recent philosophy has treated gratitude as too narrowly an issue of justice, asking the question “When is gratitude owed ?” Fitzgerald argues compellingly that there are plenty of cases when gratitude may not, in strict justice, be owed and yet may be ethically good and psychologically and personally beneficial. He focuses particularly on expressions of gratitude that seem anomalous to contemporary ethicists (gratitude for those who harm us, gratitude toward those whom we benefit).

He concludes that gratitude should not be not marginal to ethics but central: “Gratitude, unlike duty, has an emotional component. Since morality commonly demands gratitude, it commonly demands that we cultivate specific emotions. By looking at gratitude we see the poverty of an approach to ethics that focuses too heavily on action. Morality makes serious demands about the character of our mental life. By analyzing gratitude we are reminded of the importance of the work that we must do to shape our internal life in beneficial ways. Finally, gratitude is not a side issue in the sense that the consequences of gratitude can be significant. Gratitude offers a way to avoid many sources of suffering in ourselves and in others. It offers a way to avoid psychological patterns that can harm us physically and psychologically, destroy our most important relationships, and lead to actions that harm others. In all of these ways gratitude is at the center of ethics, not at its fringe.”