Kevin Giles's The Eternal Generation of the Son targets Evangelical theologians who deny the Son's eternal generation. He also challenges Evangelical theologians who teach that the Son is “functionally” but not ontologically subordinate to the Father, or subordinate in “role” though not in being, or eternally under the authority of the Father. I agree with Giles that the doctrine of eternal generation is true, biblically rooted and theologically fruitful, not to mention an axiom of the Christian tradition for a millennium and a half. But on the issue of functional subordination or “hierarchy,” some of Giles's turns of argument muddle rather than clarify; he sometimes attributes positions to his opponent that I doubt his opponents would accept. My point here is not to defend Giles's opponents, but to offer a plea for clarity and charity. A few infelicities will illustrate.

On historical theology: Giles writes that the Cappadocians called the Father the “cause,” “source,” and “origin” of the Son, while simultaneously denying that “causation in divine life implies or indicates the subordination of what is caused. . . . Basil argues that fire is the ‘cause' of light and Gregory of Nyssa that the sun is the ‘cause' of light, and in neither case an the light be separated or subordinated in time or rank to what caused it.” Thus, though “caused” by the Father, “the Son is of the same being, power and rank as the Father. Oneness in divine being is what unites them as equals, and this is predicated on the Father as the arche and the eternal begetter of the Son, which results in their oneness in power, inseparable operations, unity of will, and mutual indwelling.”

Giles acknowledges that “the way they speak of the Father as the Monarche (mia arche) of the Son and the Spirit has been criticized by Western theologians,” who see this as a hint that “at the very least conceptually gives pre-eminence to the Father.” He quotes Gregory of Nazianzus' effort to address this problem: “I am afraid to use the word origin (arche), lest I should make him [the person of the Father] the origin of inferiors, and thus insult him by precedence of honor. For the lowering of those who are from him is no glory to the source” (142). Yet he goes on to insist that “the Cappadocian fathers were totally opposed to hierarchical ranking in divine life” (143). He offers a catena of quotations opposing “superiority and inferiority in attributes” and “unequal degrees of Godhead” and inequality “in substance or natures.” He quotes Robert Letham's summary: “All three persons are God in themselves. None is more and none is less God than the others” (143).

In context, this is part of an argument to show that contemporary Evangelicals are out of step with the tradition, but so far as I can see he hasn't demonstrates that. From the information that Giles provides, it seems clear that his opponents would fully agree that the Father and Son are utterly equal in their Godhood. And it's hard to see how Giles's claim that the Cappadocians were “totally opposed to hierarchical ranking in divine life” fits with his acknowledgement that some of their statements suggest a “pre-eminence” in the Father.

Theologically: Giles says that the distinction between ontological subordination and subordination in “role and authority” makes no difference: “A necessary and eternal subordination of the Son in role and authority in the immanent Trinity implies the ontological subordination of the Son. If the Son is necessarily and eternally subordinated, his subordination defines his being as the Son. His subordination is, then, what indelibly distinguishes him from the Father. What is more, arguing for the eternal subordination of the Son in authority reflects one of the basic elements of Arianism. . . . For the Arians subordination in being implied subordination in authority and vice versa” (212).

Well, no. That doesn't follow at all. Yes, an eternal subordination of the Son implies that subordination defines his being as the Son. Giles's own phrase is crucial. “Functional subordination” is, for these Evangelical theologians, an aspect of the personal particularity of the Son; it doesn't define His being as eternal God, but His hypostatic existence as Son. One might say that because the eternal sonship of the Son defines His being and so necessarily implies that He is a different being from the Father. His sonship “indelibly distinguishes him from the Father,” and so implies that the Father and Son are ontologically distinct. That is perfect Arianism; but denying the conclusion (that the Son is a different being from the Father) doesn't entail denying the premise (that sonship defines the Son's being as Son). Of course it does. What else could?

Giles argument slops together things that his opponents, on Giles's own testimony, want to keep distinguished. The Son is subordinate as Son, even while being utterly equal in deity. To say that his opponents employ “one of the basic elements of Arianism” is an egregious guilt-by-association. Giles calls the Son “Son”; so do Arians. Therefore, he is employing “one of the basic elements of Arianism.”

Both sides have failed to grasp fully the logic of Trinitarian theology, and its radical disruption of ordinary ontological assumptions. Giles denies subordination of all kinds on the apparent assumption that all subordination is or implies ontological inferiority. He rejects the idea that the Son is somehow “dependent” on the Father as a step toward Arianism. By the logic of Trinitarian theology, though, gift and reception, sending and being sent, action and passion are internal to the life of God. Father, Son, and Spirit live eternally in mutual dependence.